The Gauls had been the terror of Rome for centuries. Whoever conquered them would be the national hero. Caesar understood this. His mission was to protect the Province; he purposed to subdue Gaul. He worked for his own ends as much as for Rome, but he understood his problem thoroughly. He considered the strategic field of Gaul with a clear eye, and committed no errors in his general plan. It was natural that he should make early mistakes of detail, for Caesar had not been brought up as a soldier; and we find a hesitancy in his first campaigns which later he threw off. His line of advance from the Province through central Gaul was in strict accord with the topographical values, and he studied the tribal instincts keenly. He educated himself as he went along, profiting by all his mistakes. His campaigns across the Rhine and to Britain were useless; they did not aid the general scheme. Cæsar was energetic in obtaining information, ingenious in contending with new obstacles, intelligent in selecting his objective, careful of his base. He demanded severe exertions from his men, but rewarded them handsomely. He was much aided by fortune, but under trial was doubly energetic. In view of the fact that Caesar entered the Gallic campaign without experience in war, it was a marvelous success.
IT has already been pointed out that Caesar, on being appointed governor of Gaul, had been vested with no right to do more than protect the exposed boundaries of the then Province. All prefects had confined themselves to this role. The laws of nations in Caesar's day had already received some recognition; but right was no valid argument against might, and few rights were accorded to barbarian tribes by Rome in the last century before the Christian era, least of all to the redoubted Gauls, who had so often brought Rome to the verge of ruin. Rome at that day was lawless. Every great man wrought for himself. Caesar had been brought up in a school which prompted him to bend all things to his ambition. He represented a great party; only by his personal success could his party succeed. War meant to him an army; an army was to him but a means of winning power. When he went to Gaul, Pompey was distinctly the leader of the triumvirate. With a man of Caesar's make-up, this could not last. Like his colleague, Caesar soon recognized that he must aim at the sole control of Rome if he would win any standing. Without war and conquest, he could gain neither the experience, fame nor influence requisite to this end. This was no unworthy ambition. Caesar could not be great with a lesser end in view, and the importance of his object was equaled by the splendor of his means. To deliver the republic forever from the Gauls was to make their conqueror the foremost of the Romans, as the Gauls had been the most dreaded of the foes of Rome. To subdue Gaul was a stepping-stone to certain and unapproached renown.
Caesar was fortunate. At the very inception of his charge of Gaul, the outbreak of the Helvetii opportunely occurred, and led, in its progress, to the current of events which ended in the conquest of the entire country. One thing after another, with Caesar's uniform good fortune, was sure to happen, to give him at least a pretense of right in extending his conquests. The Helvetian question solved, the Aedui called in his aid against the Germans under Ariovistus. In this, too, Caesar could assert that he was but protecting the allies of the Province. The Romans always helped their allies when by so doing they could help themselves. Caesar worked on the like theory. Gaul publicly thanked the consul for freeing her from the Helvetii and the Germans; but Gaul did not then anticipate her own subjugation.