Balance Of Power Essay

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Balance of power in international relations refers to the effort by states, in the face of a threat to security projected by a hostile, powerful third state, to offset aggression through association. The balance of power operates most effectively in a central system of three to five member states—neither too few nor too many—and roughly equal power, so that each state possesses enough weight to count in the balance. Small or weak states bandwagon because they cannot balance larger states. Historically, in a system of virtually perpetual warfare among states, as occurred in the seventeenth century, any increase in power would trigger a new balance. Modern conditions, where peace usually prevails, require an increase in both threat and power to trigger the formation of a new balance. Powerful Germany is no threat to Belgium; Belgium does not need to balance Germany and does not try. Nor does Canada seek to balance the United States, which is ten times its size in terms of gross national product or population.

Why do alliances form within a balance-of-power framework? Conservative-realists argue that alliances form to counter a common external threat. Liberal-idealists argue that alliances form among like-minded governments with a similar cultural and institutional outlook. Stressing instead the role of institutions such as the United Nations, liberals, like postmodernists, tend to emphasize the shortcomings and contradictions of the balance of power to the point of rejection. Constructivists replace interest with identity, making balance of-power calculations difficult.

Neorealism subscribes to the idea of anarchy or independence among states, thus permitting a balance of power to operate. But more recent theories of hegemony require that the notion of hierarchy replace anarchy as a core concept; one state is dominant, the others are subordinate. In terms of assumption and operation, hegemony and balance of power are incompatible.

When force is used to preserve security, peace may be undercut. Critiques of the shortcomings of the balance of power fail to distinguish its separate impact on security and peace. Although the balance of power probably has deterred many aggressors, it admittedly has failed to stop all wars. But it has preserved the security of the major states, such as in the alliance of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War II (1939–1945). It also has preserved the decentralized nation-state system from military takeover.

When facing rising and declining power in the system, the balance of power gives off the wrong signals. Rising power internal to the state can never be halted; declining power can never be permanently bolstered. Prior to World War I (1914–1918), rising Germany should not have been isolated and encircled; the war arose from an attempt by the system to constrain Germany’s power rather than accommodate Germany’s rise with legitimate role adjustment before it was too late, that is, before the “bounds of the system” shattered its expectations of continued rise and future opportunity for role gratification. Prior to World War II, declining Germany should have been balanced immediately; it had no role deficit, and Hitler’s territorial demands were inherently aggressive. While preserving security, such a dynamic equilibrium requires a strategy of adaptation to cope with the legitimate role aspirations of rising power, and a strategy of opposition and balance to deal with potentially expansionist behavior. Democracies can use balance and dynamic equilibrium to their advantage, but, as Henry Kissinger has noted, such thinking does not come easily to the democratic mind.

Bibliography:

  1. Doran, Charles F. Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century’s End. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
  2. Haas, Ernst B. “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, Propaganda.” World Politics 5 (1953): 446–477.
  3. Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Touchstone, 1994.
  4. Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2001.
  5. Rosecrance, Richard. Action and Reaction in World Politics. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963.
  6. Walt, Steven. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987.
  7. Wight, Martin. Power Politics. London: Continuum International, 2002.

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