The field of environmental ethics has developed its own approaches for dealing with problems that the natural environment poses for ethical thinking. Sometimes called the greening of philosophy, this field is attempting to provide alternatives to the anthropocentrism that undergirds traditional approaches, approaches that view the environment as something separate or external to humans, its having merely instrumental value, and as reinforced by and in turn reinforcing the dualism and individualism characteristic of the Modern World View. In opposition to this, environmental ethics has developed philosophical frameworks which extend moral consideration to nature; this endeavor has taken two very different paths: first, moral extensionism and eligibility; second, biocentrism and deep ecology.

Moral extensionism and eligibility focuses on the extension of rights to nonhuman nature in various degrees. The more limited view extends moral consideration only as far as animals, on the grounds that animals are sentient beings able to suffer and feel pain. Under this position, any view which holds that the effects of our actions on nonhuman animals have no intrinsic moral significance is arbitrary and morally indefensible, analogous to our past treatment of African-American slaves. In the latter cake, the suffering of an African-American slave was not considered to have the same moral significance as the suffering of a white person, while in the former case the suffering of nonhuman animals is not considered to have the same moral significance as the suffering of humans. Instead of racism in regard to the treatment of African Americans, we have "speciesism" in regard to the treatment of nonhuman animals. The logic of racism and the logic of speciesism are the same. And just as concern for the equal treatment of African Americans through legislation and regulation moved us to a different level of moral consciousness, so too should we be brought to a different level of moral consciousness concerning animals as beings who have interests and can suffer.

This view is generally considered too limited by the environmental movement, and more radical frameworks extend it to include all life forms. The most radical frameworks reject a moral boundary even at the edge of life and argue for ethical consideration for rocks, soil, water, and air, finding no justification for drawing any ethical boundaries whatsoever. This view argues that while these broader extensions may seem absurd to some, so did the extension of certain rights to women and minorities at one point in our history. And the argument call be made that the extension of rights in this manner would help environmentalists better protect the environment and also reflect the recognition that nature needs to be preserved for its own sake and not just for the interest of humans.

It seems clear that the attempt to extend rights in this manner represents an effort to build a wider moral community that includes ill or parts of the natural world and, in this sense, to overcome the anthropocentrism that separates humans from nature. But while moral extensionism and eligibility in environmental ethics attempts to bring animals and even other aspects of nature into the moral community by extending rights to them, these arguments are subject to strong theoretical attack. Rights apply to individuals and their interests, while environmentalists are concerned with protecting systems and species, which are not individuals and do not have interests in a normal sense. Moreover, rights are bestowed on animals and other aspects of nature by humans, thereby making the moral standing of nonhuman aspects of nature dependent upon humans.

Thus, while rights theory in environmental ethics works to overcome the traditional limitations, it can in large measure be seen to be caught in the theoretical web of anthropomorphism and individualism which is found in the tradition of rights theory--and which still by and large undergirds various theories in business ethics. Regardless of the environmentalists' arguments pro and con, it seems that these rights are not possible through social contract theories as used in business ethics, because nonhumans cannot enter into covenants of this nature.

Partly as a result of the problems in moral extensionism and eligibility, biocentric ethics and deep ecology developed as alternative approaches. These frameworks offer a much more revolutionary stance, arguing that the mere enlargement of the class of morally considerable beings is an inadequate substitute for a genuine environmental ethic. The extension of rights to other objects or to future generations does not deal with deeper philosophical questions about the relation of humans and nature. Societies need to be understood in an ecological context and it is this larger whole which in the bearer of value. An environmental ethic, while paying its respects to individualism and humanism, must break free of these two concepts and deal with the way the universe in operating. . .