A sensible discussion of the issue of pornography and censorship obviously depends on our having either a shared conception of pornography or, at least, a clear understanding of our differences. Consider, for instance, the empirical question whether the free availability of pornography in society would have harmful consequences. This question could not be answered without specifying what will be counted as pornography. Moreover, the account of pornography used to answer this question will affect the bearing the answer has on the public policy issue that concerns us. That is, if we who pose the public policy issue have a conception of pornography different from that employed by researchers who are attempting to answer the empirical question, their answers may be misleading. Also, philosophical positions about the issue of pornography and censorship may be misleading in the context of the popular debate if the philosophical and popular conceptions of pornography differ.

Conceptions of pornography do in fact differ quite widely. And even when conceptions of pornography are similar, there are differences in what things are counted as pornographic. It could happen that two people share a single conception of pornography as, say, sexually explicit depictions that violate the proper canons of modesty; yet, because of different beliefs about the canons of modesty, they differ on whether a particular depiction is pornographic. In short, two kinds of disagreement occur: there are differences about the conception on the one hand; and there are differences about the "extension" of the concept on the other hand, differences that may occur between people even if they share a conception. These two kinds of disagreement cause confusion and, in fact, may make it misleading to describe the debate as a debate about pornography. The latter description may suggest, perhaps falsely, that one specifiable kind of phenomenon is the sole subject of the debate.

However, insofar as it is true that one kind of phenomenon is a shared subject of debate, it is clear that that phenomenon consists of at least depictions of sexual organs and behavior. The word "pornography" was originally used in English to refer to descriptions of the lives, manners, etc., of prostitutes and their patrons. It now refers to obscene or unchaste depictions in literature, art, and so on. 1 It is true that depictions can be obscene without having to do with sex. For instance, depictions of human excremental functions are often regarded as obscene because they are offensive to modesty; but the etymology of the word "pornography" suggests that its primary use should be to refer to obscene depictions of sexual organs or behavior. We need the qualification that the depictions be obscene because we do not regard depictions in medical or sociological studies of sexual organs or behavior as pornographic; nor are they obscene. Accordingly, in this introduction we will take pornography to consist in obscene depictions of sexual organs or behavior.

It should be clear that poems, novels, plays, movies, photographs, and staged acts can all be, or include, depictions of sexual subjects. Most people would regard as pornographic explicit depictions of violent sadomasochistic sex and explicit depictions of certain of the more recherche sex acts. The mere exposure of human mammary and genital organs would less generally be regarded as obscene. Then again, certain novels that once were generally found obscene, such as Lady Chatterley's Lover or Ulysses, are probably less widely considered so today. One person's "pornographic passage" may be another person's "realistic depiction of an important part of life."

One conclusion that might mistakenly be drawn from such disagreements would be that porngoraphy is "in the eye of the beholder," that pornography relative to a given person consists of sexual depictions that offend that person. Of course, people are often deeply offended and affronted by depictions they regard as pornographic. It may even be that we would not think of anything as pornographic if we believed that no one is ever offended by a sexual depiction. However, some people may be quite detached about what they regard as pornographic; it need not cause one shocked sensibility, embarrassment, or feelings of anger, disgust, or what have you. The possibility of having this kind of detached attitude suggests that a belief rather than an emotional reaction is central to one's decision that a given sexual depiction is obscene, and hence pornographic. The belief would be that there are standards or canons that delineate what may not properly or appropriately be depicted, as well as the manner of appropriate depiction. We will call these "canons of propriety" or of "appropriateness," leaving open for the moment many questions about their nature and justification. Different people might accept different standards in relation to sexual depictions of modesty; others would regard much of the allegedly pornographic as merely erotic. The difference would be neither merely a difference in aesthetic reaction, nor merely a difference in emotional reaction, though both of these could be involved. The central difference would lie in what is believed to be the correct standard of propriety or of appropriateness in relation to sexual depictions. . .